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CHAPTER I.
Sentiments In relation to moral Judgment•
Sect, 1, Westermarck*3 view of the emotional haals of moral
*
Judgment,
•• 2, Truth and moral Judgment,
3, Reason and feeling in moral Judgment.
•• 4, Mr, Shand*a definitions of sentiments,
,, 5, The nature of sentiments and their relation to character,
6. Moral sentiments,
,, 7, Influences affecting the development of sentiments.
2,
The place and importance of emotion in the moral life are 
becoming increasingly recognised and considered in the discussions 
on ethical questions by modern writers on these subjects.
The views of one writer, Westermarck, are of particular 
interest, because he states them so uncompromisingly and clearly.
In discussing the question of the primacy of reason or 
feeling in the origin of moral concepts Westermarck states that 
"Moral concepts are ultimately based on emotions either of approval 
or indignation." (The Origin and Development of Moral Ideas, 
vol. I., p. 4.)
He realises the fact that moral judgments may be applications 
of some accepted rule, and that conformity to the rule determines 
the judgment,, but even in this case the moral consciousness 
recognises the rule as valid because it has an emotional sanction. 
On the whole Westermarck confines himself to refuting the in- 
tellectualipt view and gives little positive account of his 
reasons for giving morality an emotional basis, perhaps because 
it is, as he says, self-evident.
When we consider the rise of moral judgment among primitive 
moral agents it would seem obvious that certain acts would arouse 
emotions of approval or disapproval, and that in consequence of 
such emotions the acts in question would tend to be 
tfcâ forbidden, that is to say, in consequence of the emotion 
aroused by a particular mode of conduct, such a mode of conduct 
would be enforced -and forbidden and so become customary among
3 .
the membera of the tribe. Of the origins of and reasons for 
such customs the individuals conforming to them could certainly 
give no rational account. This appears to be Westermarck*s view.
2. But he proceeds to draw from it extreme and disturbing conclu­
sions. He says. "There can be no moral truth. . . . .
The ultimate reason for this is, that the moral concepts are 
based upon moral emotions, and the contents of an emotion fall 
entirely outside the category of truth." (Ibid. p. 17.)
If this were so we should have to regard the emotional 
origin of morality as something quite inexplicable, implying 
in the constitution of man a kind of natural moral In
discussing the question of ethical subjectivism Westermarck 
does seem to approach this view, but it appears to be merely a 
matter of expression.
There are, according to him, certain attributes which dis­
tinguish moral resentment and moral approval from non-moral 
emotions. Emotions of approval and resentment are only moral 
if they possess disinterestedness, impartiality and generality.
Westermarck gives a very clear and interesting account of 
the way in which these moral attributes arise in connection 
with emotions, and appears to show at the same time how general 
moral truths are possible. To some extent these general and 
impersonal qualities come to be attached to emotions of resent­
ment and approval through sympathy. Sympathy by association and 
active sympathy which springs from natural affection exist and
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develop because the individual is a social being. Even more 
important for the development of morality is the fact that 
custom itself possesses these general attributes and moral judg­
ments develop in and through custom, of which indeed they are 
the offspring.
The customs and morality of primitive man are not distin­
guishable, custom is the condition of moral stability and 
progress. And it would seem that the moral predicate qcquired 
through emotion would be true in relation to social ends.
The acts that aroused an immediate emotion on the part of 
the tribe did so, no doubt, because they tended to further or 
inhibit some instinctive tendency. The judgment dependent on 
such emotion would itself be almost Instinctive. But every 
tendency haai an end, and analysis might show a constant relation 
between moral predicates and the social and individual ends of 
man. Suc^ analysis would demand a considerable degree of 
culture. But at the stage now reached we do actually discover 
a connection between moral judgments and various ends which appear 
good to man. In relation, then, to individual and social ends 
we do find general moral truths.
It is not, of course, denied that many of the customs of 
savage races appear to be irrelevant to any possible human end.
For many of them would arise through association of the most 
irrational kind, one custom might in this way suggest others, 
and their inspiration would depend also to some extent on in­
dividual eccentricity, so that quite unnecessary and even
5 .
injurious customs might arise, (though the latter could hardly 
become permanent). Yet the fostering of social qualities and 
the self-control necessitated by custom still make for social 
progress.
Carveth Read in criticising Westermarck writes, "A man 
of refined emotions may have a strong instinctive approval of 
duelling (say) in some cases of family honour, and yet may bring 
himself to disapprove of it, if reflection convinces him that it 
is not the beat way of securing the ends of social life."
(Natural and Social Morals, p. 130.)
The use of the term "disapprove" here seems to justify
Westermarck*8 view of the necessity of an emotional sanction 
for a moral judgment in that he admits that, "All higher emotions
are determined by cognitions, . . . • and moral enlight­
enment implies a true and comprehensive presentation of those 
objective conditions by which the moral emotions, according to 
their very nature, are determined." (Westermarck, op. cit. vol.
X•, p. 10 * )
But also Professor Read’s example shows that a moral judg­
ment may be true or false. In the case cited the first judgment
that duelling, in certain cases, is right would be false, and the 
reflective judgment forbidding duelling would be true.
Since all self-conscious beingsJwqrk for more or less 
remote ends which appear to them good and moral, and this implies
a recognised system of ideal conduct, the moral judgments within
the system possess truth, and since also such ends are always
6 .
part social there are general moral truths.
3. Nevertheless no end could appear good unless it had an emotional 
sanction. It must have value for our emotional dispositions.
No purely rational judgment could make us accept any action 
or ideal as good apart from its value for our affective life.
This appears to be as self-evident as Westermarck pronounces it.
It is unquestionable that moral progress is only possible 
through an increasingly clear understanding of the meaning of 
conduct and ideals, and so morality becomes rationalised and 
must continue to do so, but it is no less true that our affective 
dispositions become rationalised and organised, and that while 
they retain their affective character, they thus enter into 
new fields and follow new directions*
Our emotiond are not arbitrary nor disconnected with the 
rest of our mental life. "The core of every emotion is an im­
pulse or active tendency." (Carveth Read, op. cit. p. 73.)
It is reason that grasps the outcome of such tendencies, 
and brings them to a successful issue or inhibits them, for 
through understanding the results of an emotional impulse, new 
emotional dispositions whose tendency leads in another direction 
may be awakened. It is clear that bur affective life must be 
organised for the requirements of moral progress. We cannot 
trust ourselves to' the impulse of the moment, our impulses are 
too numerous and may be contradictory. Our emotions,being in­
tense and active, would destroy the continuity and unity of 
mental life if left unsystematised.
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As our purposes are many and some of greater permanence 
and wider scope than others our emotions become organised in 
connection with these* They come to further not our momentary 
impulses, but our more remote and constant purposes, and finally 
our ideals of life. That is, our emotions become rationalised, 
they change their character to some extent and become sentiments.
4. The following account given by Mr. Shand makes the nature
of these clear.
"The fundamental distinction between emotion on the one 
hand and sentiments on the other, and the principle on which 
their organisation rests, is that the one are merely adjectival 
and attach themselves, or more correctly blend, as temporary 
qualifications in those more complex and persistent feelings 
which they both serve to develop and into which they are 
absorbed; while the others are the substantival and persistent 
sentiments which include them, and which in each particular 
case suffuse them with something of their own flavour the emotion 
which happens to be excited in them." And further, "The 
sentiment, as interpreted from outside, is the thought of an 
object as a permanent thing or quality. And this identity of 
thought which refers to the same object with its feeling tone 
and conative tendency, which persists through the emotional 
phases excited in it, is the sentiment." (Mind.N.S. vol V. 
Character and the Emotions.)
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5. A sentiment thus always centres about an idea or group
of ideas, and is relatively permanent. The emotions which the 
sentiment includes vary in intensity and in kind. It depends, 
for instance, on the circumstances of the central object whether 
anger, sorrow, or joy is awakened within such a sentiment as 
love.
Most individuals possess several sentiments, for they tend 
to grow up about all our interests if we have any opportunity 
for cultivating such interests.
The several sentiments may be fairly equal in strength, 
but as a rule one is more important than the rest, and theye 
are subordinate sentiments. In some cases one sentiment may 
absorb practically the whole personality, and everything gives 
way to it. Napoleon’s ruling sentiment was presumably ambition, 
and no other consideration could weigh against:it.
Obviously sentiments are of first importance for conduct.
They serve as a continual source of activity and judgment, if
they are strong and permanent in an individual he tends to further
the ideas which are their centre in every possible way, and
these ideas determine his judgments of value. The individual
whose sentiments are weak and relatively brief appears unstable 
in action, he can hardly be self-reliant or possess much initiative, 
he tends to be guided by those whose sentiments are strong, 
for he has little within him to oppose them.
An individual’s different sentiments may or may not be
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consistently organised with relation to each other. A man may 
exalt liberty and yet act tyrannically, or love humanity but 
dislike his fellow countrymen.
Again sentiments may be narrow or far-reaching. On this 
depends our judgment of a man’s charàcter. The good man 
must be capable of family affection, and perform family duties, 
be a good citizen, love his country and not be indifferent to 
the claims of the foreigner.
An individual’s character is to a great extent his sentiments, 
It is true, as Mr. McDougall says, that a man may have a strong 
sentiment without having a strong character, since he may be 
strong only in a given direction. Character is, in fact, - 
wider than any sentiment or group of sentiments. It is in part 
innate, since it may be inherited; this does not distinguish 
character from sentiments, for, though the latter are acquired, 
character includes them, and sentiments are probably based on 
innate dispositions. Tradition and education affect character 
in that they determine to a great extent what disposition 
shall develop, and prevent the development of many natural 
tendencies by denying them opportunity for expression. These 
undeveloped dispositions,however, are elements of character, 
they are probably always more than mere potentialities, they 
tend to become active, and in any case do so indirectly by 
affecting the more fully developed contents of character.
"The character of a man is that which characterises him, 
that which makes him what he is, not another." (Fr. Paulhan,
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Les caractères, p.l.) And this depends not only on native 
capacity and experience on which that capacity works, hut on 
the organisation of the mental contents in relation to experience 
and each other. The tendencies, feelings, and thoughts which 
form the contents of character can only organise about the 
objects of experience and in relation to each other as sentiments,by 
the development of these within it character attains stability , 
and unity.
This organisation is never complete, the sentiments do not 
contain all the desires and tendencies of any given individual.
So when our friends surprise us by acting, as we think, 
inconsistently, they may be expressing their characters as truly 
as when they fulfil our expectations. Further we find that we 
re-act to new occasions immediately and appropriately, though 
the mental attitude implied in such reaction lies outside our 
organised sentiments. In Silas Marner George Eliot tells the 
story of a miser who loses his hoard, and immediately after meets 
with a child, and the man whose ruling sentiment is avarice 
becomes the child’s devoted guardian. This immediate response 
to the little one’s presence implied actual qualities of character 
not contained in the dominant sentiment which in itself was 
opposed to such response, nor explicable through the loss of his 
wealth alone.
The elements of character are too numerous and complex for 
knowledge. We cannot therefore accurately define character in
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terms of any system of its contents such as a sentiment.
Nevertheless, admitting the limitations of our knowledge, 
we do fairly judge a man’s character by his habits of acting, 
feeling, and thinking, and these habits are sentiments. Character 
and sentiments dwindle and grow together. Narrow sentiments 
inevitably starve character, Ribot gives examples of curiously 
narrow sentiments in his "Essai sur les Passions", Curio hunting 
may absorb so much of a man’s thought and energy, that he may be 
hardly capable of dealing with the more important claims of life. 
Well organised and permanent sentiments imply a well organised 
and permanent character.
Through experience and activity sentiments must inevitably 
develop and expand, and connect themselves with new experiences, 
and so take on new aspects. The better understanding of the 
central ideas, and their association with other ideas lead to growth 
and relative change. A complete change of sentiments is rare 
and overwhelming. They do change, but as a rule gradually, 
either in themselves, or in their relative prominence in an 
individual’s consciousness, age and circumstances help to decide 
which sentiment shall be dominant.
When through loss or disillusionment the ideas with which 
our affective dispositions are organised cease to be, the loss 
appears to the individual, and in fact is, almost irreparable.
For part of his very self has gone, not only the object of his 
thoughts, but the spring of his actions, part of his affective
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life itself, he is in very truth Iobc. than he was. Kcr can he 
find inii; ediate consolation. Other ideas, no doubt, can and 
probably do take the place of the old ones, but there can be 
no mere substitution, the growth of sentiments is a slow pro­
cess, and time and experience are necessary for the organisation 
of desires and emotions which is implied in the formation of a 
sentiment. It appears even from the few examples mentioned that 
almost any object of experience may serve as the dominant idea 
of a sentiment. Normally, however, the important interests of 
an individual’s life, his work, his career, his family and social 
relationships, some all of are the centre of his sentiments.
It would seem also that sentiments, though invariably 
intelloctualised, may be so in a varying degree, and that emotion 
may have little part to play in the development of some. A man 
may dwell in a state of calm satisfaction and yet possess strong
sentiments, if his circumstances are happy he may hardly experience :
I
any strong emotion concerning the purposes of his life. And if i
this is so, are not the affective basis and content of such j
sentiments assumed ? We may consider the attitude of Aristotle’s |
’ philosopher towards the contemplative life in this connection.
As Aristotle was himself a philosopher we have but to remember 
the impassioned language in which he exalts the philosophical 
life to realise that his sentiment for a life of pure, reason was
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based on an affective disposition. And we may admit that sentiments 
though they generally involve emotions, are not dependent on 
them. Our feelings may be satisfied through intense intellectual
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activity, and reflection is always necessary for the systématisation 
of our feelings.
In the following extract Mr. Shand uses M. Ribot*s word 
passion for sentiment which he himself prefers.
"Since passion requires so much thought and reflection
to organise its emotions and desires, and to accomplish and 
harmonise its ends, there will be recurrent phases of its history 
in which it is without emotion. But passionless as it then ;
appears, it is still moved by one or other of its great controlling
desires, it is;still from beginning to end an organised succession 
of desires and emotions." (Mind. N. S. vol. 16, M. Ribot’s 
Theory of the Passions.)
6. Sentiments are concrete, their centre is then actual individuals
or objects; or abstract, when they are controlled by ideals of
conduct, qualities and dispositions of character. This distinction
has bearing in connection with moral sentiments..
All sentiments whose object has a social reference are moral, 
these sentiments are the sources of our judgments of value, and 
our judgments are moral in so far as they possess general validity
with reference to action • and disposition.
The concrete and abstract sentiments are closely connected, 
the former may suggest the latter. The judgments we pass on some 
individual may be the beginning of an abstract sentiment. Thus, 
the just behaviour of an admired character may teach us to love 
justice itself. The application of a sentiment is always concrete.
The universal quality necessary in moral judgment is more
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essentially a feature of abstract sentiments. Devotion to an 
individual or a particular cause, though moral in itself, may 
render the pronouncement of judgments possessing universal validty 
difficult and even impossible, for we may wish to exclude the 
particular individual or cause.
We may, therefore, agree with Mr. McDougall that, "Sentiments 
for abstract objects, the various qualities of conduct and of 
character, are the specifically moral sentiments." (Social 
Psychology, p. 219.)
The moral value of a sentiment cannot depend on the nature 
of its object alone, the strength of the feelings towards the 
object are not less important than an enlightened understanding 
of the meaning of social life. Feeling within a sentiment
I
must be real, continuous and intimately blended with the object 
and its implications. Otherwise a sentiment cannot be effective 
and consistent in conduct.
7. It has been shown that sentiments are constructions formed
in the life history of an individual. We need not doubt that 
they are affected by inherited dispositions and temperament, 
still they are made to some extent by the individual himself, 
and that is why they seem so intimately his. Their construction, 
however, is still more dependent on the social tradition and 
environment into which the individual is born than upon his 
choice. We need not exaggerate these relatively external factors, 
custom tends to lose its power as social life grows more complex. 
So that in modern civilisation individuality as such has some
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opportunity of development. The cuetoms of primitive society
are rigid and pervasive, there is little occasion for ^ purpose
(
in reflection and choice. Reflection and choice are, therefore, 
not exercised. In civilised societies codes of behaviour are 
not fixed, in the experience of individuals fashions spring up 
and die away, and concerning important modes of conduct the ideas 
not only of class and profession differ in some degree, but the 
views of individuals themselves vary, home, school and friends 
thus give a child several standards. There is, of course, 
sufficient unanimity to support legal justice, and even to improve 
it, and differences of opinion are rarely so extreme and real as 
to interfere with intercourse. Yet there is enough con­
trast and variety to awaken reflection among those capable of it. 
And just because an individual is a thinking, feeling being he 
cornea to value certain modes of behaviour rather than others, 
just as he values some individuals and objects more than others.
He thus judges, and abstracts qualities and dispositions from 
the individuals who possess them, in connection with such 
qualities the already active emotional tendencies develop and 
a sentiment begins to be formed. Custom and tradition weaken 
not only through the increasing complexity of life, but they 
yield to the influence of exceptional individuals. Society 
owes much to its great personalities. These are innovators, 
they make opportunity and mould circumstance. They are, however, 
the children of their age, for moral tradition speaks effectively 
enough in them, even if negatively. Their capacity and originality
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exist not only in their ideas, though these are above the 
common level, they can defy custom, and break habits, they 
will not imitate, but act with the independence and indiffer­
ence of leaders long before they have gained a hearing and sup­
port. It is these qualities that make them so formidable to 
the uninitiated whose convictions are strong but narrow. The 
unconscious isolation of the elect rouses resentment, their 
certainty and constancy of purpose may appear as alarming as 
the action of some impersonal, natural force. The majority 
of individuals, however, do not possess a compelling, inner 
strength which can offer resistance to the influence of the 
external world. They are moulded by tradition, environment 
and education through their imitativeness and suggestibility.
As social beings we tend to live in a crowd, and to 
acquire the qualities of the crowd so well described by Le Bon, 
irrationality, emotional excitability and suggestibility. At 
school his schoolfellows may Influence a child in these direc­
tions which are strengthened by the imitativeness natural to 
normal individuals.
Principles of conduct may, therefore, be accepted for reasons 
other than their intrinsic value to the individual. Irrational 
associations are easily formed under the influences indicated 
above, minor principles deduced from wider ones with which they 
are not connected.
For instance, though Socialism has its own dangers, it is 
often criticised for features not peculiar to it, nor even
17.
necessarily involved in it, sometimes it is even blamed for the 
weaknessess of human nature; itself, though these must be 
present in every form of government.
We may form imitative judgments through ignorance, lack 
of critical power, through admiration for some individual who 
may have prestige due to his position, or because we admire him 
for certain qualities we may accept his ruling in all depart­
ments of life.
V/e are apt also to fall into the emotional attitude of 
those about us through mere contagion, we imitate their move­
ments and expressions unconsciously, their mood thus becomes 
ours and we utter similar judgments.
If such influences are continuous, habitual dispositions 
are formed, the imitative judgments become our own and may 
operate as opposing forces to new ideas. It is clear that all 
this may work for good and ill.
Further many of our judgments are subconscious, we judge 
too constantly and rapidly for clear realisation of either our 
judgments or their motives.
And this is well, since reflection concerning every act 
of ourselves or others would render activity impossible. Le 
Bon maintains throughout his "Psychologie de l’éducation" that 
our motives and judgments must be subconscious for good moral 
character. However true this may be, there is a danger that 
dispositions that are not moral in their tendencies may grow 
up and attain strength in the absence of rational guidance ,
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A disintegration of consciousness may result with most undesirable 
effects on character, and render us incapable of judging our­
selves. How complete the difference between what we are and 
what we are conscious of being is shown very clearly in Meredith’s 
"Egoist". And even if the difference la brought home, the effect 
is as likely to arouse bitterness as to bring regeneration, for 
his subconscious sentiments may be too strong to allow an in­
dividual to forsake them.
We will discuss later the experience of conversion and 
that of the mystics, experiences which tend to bring about 
unity of desires and dispositions. But as reference has been 
made already to suggestion and subconsciousness, and these are 
important in connection with the experiences mentioned, it is 




Sect. 1. The meaning of suggestion.
2. , Characteristics of hypnosis.
3. Hypnosis and other mental states.
4. Dissociation of consciousness*
5. The meaning of subconsciousness.
6. Subconscious influences in intellectual life.
7. Subconscious influences in feeling.
8. Dissociation of sentiments.
9. Suggestion and^he growth of sentiments.
10. Indirect suggestion and auto*suggestion.
11. Ideals as affecting the development of sentiments.
20.
1, Suggestion and hypnotism are terms which tend to be used
in very close connection, and though suggestibility is a 
constant feature of consciousness its power in the state of 
hypnosis is more evident and less questionable than in a complete­
ly normal state. Leas questionable because the conditions are 
simpler and on the whole better known, or at least may be more 
easily investigated than those present in the complex flow of 
ordinary consciousness.
)
"Suggestion is the narrowing of the association-activity 
to definite contents of consciousness, solely through the 
employment of memory and imagination in such a way that the 
influence of combinations of contrariant ideas is weakened or 
removed, as a result of which the intensity of the suggested 
content of consciousness rises above the normal." (Dr. von 
Schrenk-Notzing, quoted by M. W. Keatinge, Suggestion in 
Education, p. 11.)
"Susceptibility to suggestion is the chief phenomenon of 
hypnosis," according to Dr. Moll. (Hypnotism, p. 205.) When 
we consider his definition of hypnosis this susceptibility is 
to some extent explained.
"Every hypnosis is a state in which the normal course of 
ideas is inhibited. . . . .  In ^particular the subject is 
unable to control the external ideas or to put forward his own, 
the external dominate his consciousness." (Ibid. p. 258.)
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Tho methods of inducing the state of hypnosis vary with 
the operator, what alone seems essential and common to all 
methods is the concentrating of the subject’s attention on a 
single object.
"In general any method which fixes the attention to a
single stimulus long enough is probably sufficient to produce
hypnosis. . . .  In view of this it is probable that 
any person in normal health can be hypnotised, provided he is
not too sceptical of the operator’s knowledge and powers."
(J.M. Baldwin, Mental Development, p. 153.)
2. The general facts concerning the hypnotic state are well
known. The subject passes into a condition in which he is 
abnormally suggestible.
There is also a peculiar rapport between subject and 
operator. For instance, it may be possible for one particular 
Individual alone to hypnotise a certain subject. In any case 
the subject is not amenable in the hypnotic state to all 
suggestions, but only to those of the operator. But the operator 
may by suggestion pass the rapport on to someone else, the 
subject then obeys the latter.
It is claimed that the mental faculties are exalted in the 
hypnotic state. (Osgood Mason, Hypnotism and Suggestion.)
This is disputed, but it would certainly appear that the 
subject is often extremely observant, gaining suggestions from 
mere movements and the unexpressed expectations of the operator.
The former shows too distinct ability in acting out the suggestions
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given, and his memory is generally unusually full and complete.
The effect of the hypnotic state on memory is deserving of 
notice. In lighter hypnosis the patient remembers afterwards 
what occurred during this state, as he might remember a dream 
on waking. In deeper hypnosis, and this is more frequently 
described, he remembers nothing of what has occurred afterwards, 
though he remembers all that happened when hypnotised again.
So that there seems a complete break between hypnosis and the 
normal state. Further in hypnosis events and memories may be 
revived, which the individual in an ordinary condition has 
utterly forgotten, and cannot recognise even when described. 
Sometimes the hypnotised subject fills in details of which in 
the waking condition he is unconscious^a ; . As a rule the 
patient remembers his normal life, but will willingly play quite 
a different part at suggestion. A secondary personality is 
at times disclosed in the hypnotic state. The primary, that is 
the ordinary personality is completely unaware of the secondary. 
The secondary as a rule knows the primary, and remembers all it 
does and knows its thoughts, but refuses to be identified with 
the primary personality, and indeed shows different characteris­
tics. Authentic cases of third and fourth personalities, all 
with individual claims and characteristics, are cited. (Morton 
Prince, The Alteration of a Personality; Alfred Binet, The 
Alterations of Personality.)
The suggestibility of the subject covers a wide range of 
facts. Within somewhat disputed limits the subject is completely
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obedient to the operator. The former moves, speaks, and goes 
through a whole sequence of actions at the suggestion of the lat­
ter. For example, he will act the part of a real or imaginary 
* person, and change from one character to another, visit distant 
countries and describe what he sees with a great deal of 
ability and some accuracy. The accuracy depends, naturally 
enough, on the general knowledge and memory of the subject.
For instance, one subject acts the part of Frederic the Great, 
and is ignorant of railways, another acts the same part and 
travels readily in a train. Even more striking phenomena of 
suggestion are apparent in the positive and negative delusions 
of the senses that may be induced. The subject sees objects 
that are not present, and behaves in accordance with the de­
lusions, e.g. he gets out of the way of an elephant. In negative 
delusions he fails to j^roeive objects that actually are present.
If it is suggested to him that a certain person present has 
gone away no efforts on the part of that person to attract the 
attention of the subject are successful.
The subject when in the state of hypnosis is sometimes given 
suggestions to be carried out during his normal condition. And 
he frequently obeys such suggestions after some interval of time. 
It must be admitted that the majority of post-hypnotic suggestions 
are obeyed shortly after waking from the hypnotic state, though 
examples of intervals of days and even months occurring between 
the giving of the suggestion and its realisation are cited. But 
it is not always certain in such cases that the suggestion may
24.
net be repeated in some way and revived in the circumstances 
of normal life.
Physiological suggestion is almost equally effective. The 
subject feels pain at suggestion. The operator may cause 
blisters, render the patient unable to move a limb and so on.
On the other hand he may by suggestion restore power in certain 
cases of paralysis, and do away with various nervous disorders.
3. Dr. Moll, who regards the state of hypnosis not as pathologi­
cal, but as a state analogous to other normal mental states,
attempts to explain the facte of the hypnotic condition in accord­
ance with two principles.
(a} "Men have a certain prcneness to allow themselves to be
influenced by others through their ideas, and in particular
to believe much without making conscious logical deductions.
(b) A psychological and physiological effect tends to appear
in a man if he is expecting it." (A. Moll, op. cit. p. 221.)
so
These principles are^obviously active in normal consciousness 
that we need not here dwell on them.
The general characteristics of the hypnotic state already 
described certainly are analogous to those of other states, and 
though such similarity does not explain these features of con- 
Bciousness, it does at least relate them to ordinary experience.
The rapport between operator and patient is paralleled in 
waking life by what we describe as personal influence, the 
influence of a peculiarly Intimate and powerful kind which a
25.
which a given Individual is able to exert over another or others, 
BO that the individual possessing such influence is able to 
profoundly affect and in a measure direct the opinions and senti­
ments of others. In the state of hypnosis it is less inexplicable 
if one considers that in all probability the rapport is suggested 
at the very outset of the state, and that it would certainly ap­
pear from the conditions of hypnotic experiment that the»sugges­
tion of rapport is being given by the operator to the patient 
continuously.
The exaltation of the faculties of the hypnotic subject 
already mentioned may be due to the fact that he lacks spontan­
eity and yet his consciousness is active, so that there is 
greater opportunity for past memories to enter into focus,and 
for impressions however slight to gain attention. The skill 
he so frequently shows in acting suggested characters may be 
accounted for by the absence of self-consciousness, the subject 
is able to let himself go undisturbed by reflections concerning 
his own ability and the opinion of those around him. We will 
consider the question of the different sets of memories revealed 
in the hypnotic and waking state, and dissociation of personality 
later.
The suggestibility of the hypnotic patient and of the in­
dividual in a normal state seem to differ, however greatly, in 
degree rather than in kind.
In a normal conscious state we tend to believe what we are 
told, and to do what we are asked apart from antagonistic ideas.
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If our senses or reflection contradicts any statement it fails, 
of course, to gain acceptance. But in a slight degree we are 
the victim# of hallucination, we may often see an object which 
is not present merely because we expect it.
Negative delusions are hardly to be paralleled in waking 
life. We have the beginning of a negative delusion when we 
fail to interpret sensations actually present. For instance, 
we turn back for the note book which is in our hands. Expecta­
tion affects our judgment here too, we fail to find an object 
though it is before our eyes if we are persuaded it is not there.
The dream consciousness and particularly somnambulism 
offer better analogies than waking consciousness. The somnambu­
list ignores whatever is not connected with his dream, and he 
carries out the ideas derived therefrom with the same apparent 
automatism as the hypnotised subject, making no response to 
suggestions that do not enter into his dream consciousness.
But it is more to the purpose to consider what view of the 
nature of consciousness will at least in part explain the phe­
nomena of the hypnotic state.
The view that tends to regard hypnosis as unconscious,#nd 
to compare the process of breathing and the action of the heart 
to the phenomena of suggestion does not seem to account for 
the facts. (Ibid. p. 267.)
It will certainly not account for the alteration of per­
sonality in the hypnotic condition. It also separates the state 
of hypnosis from a normal state too sharply. A suggestive idea
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lo one that renders ineffective critical and resistant ideas.
An idea acts suggestively in this sense in a normal as well as
in a hypnotic condition. What is remarkable in the latter state
is that almost any idea seems to be suggestive, whereas in a 
normal condition character and circumstances help to decide 
which ideas shall be suggestive.
Nor id the view that regards hypnosis as revealing a higher
and separate form of consciousness, (Osgood Mason,Hypnotism and 
Suggestion) or a lower and brutal self (Boris Sidle, The Psychol­
ogy of Suggestion) more satisfactory.
For the claim of an upper and subliminal self seems arbitrary 
and unnecessary and must also be extended to surprising dimensions 
on occasion, for more than one subliminal self may be disclosed 
in hypnotic experiment. And the facts that each brings forward 
to support the view that the subliminal self is higher or lower 
contradict each other. Yet there is ground for both sets of 
facts, and quite explicable ground if we regard hypnosis not as 
disclosing a separate and distinct self, but as a dissociation 
of consciousness.
4. Dissociation of a completer kind than is usual in normal
life might explain the phenomena, in that case the multiplicity 
of normal consciousness must be admitted. Where we meet with 
double personality, of course, association has been at work 
with dissociation, sets of images, ideas and emotional tendencies 
have been Integrated and formed into a consistent and coherent 
mass which, if dissociated from the rest of consciousness, may
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form a new personality. Failure of memory, due to a shook or 
injury, might serve to set a portion of the conscious stream 
relatively free of the rest. That the secondary personality 
is only relatively free is shown by the fact that the distinct 
personalities of one consciousness may be sometimes united through 
suggestion given to the subject in hypnosis. When such suggestion 
is successful the memories of the different personalities flow 
together and become one, and the patient in his normal condition 
recognises them as his own.
When we consider the nature of normal consciousness we find 
that it too reveals different levels in its flow and the effects 
of dissociation.
"Multiple consciousness is not the exception but the law.
For mind is a synthesis of many systems. . . . One
great principle must be at the foundation of psychology, and 
that is the synthesis of multiple consciousness in normal, and 
its disintegration in abnormal mental life." (Multiple Person­
ality, Boris Sidis and S. P. Goodheart, p. 364.)
If we regard consciousness as a stream, we must regard it 
as one in which there are innumerable eddies and currents, and 
one which widens and narrows continually.
Our purposes and our mental attitudes determine the stream 
of consciousness. Its contents differ according to the end in 
view and according to our mental condition, the latter is very 
different in work, play, revery and sleep. The varying contents 
and the currents that contain them may be relatively dissociated
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or intermingle closely. For dissociation is as much an active 
principle of mental life as association,
"Dissociation stands for divided mental alertness, a practical 
type of procedure combining activity in one realm with quiescence 
or disqualification of what in a normal attitude would be associa- 
tively active," (J, Jastrow, The Subconscious,, p, 522.)
In the present connection we might substitute the term 
"different" for "normal", for such practical dissociation is not 
other than normal.
Because of-the relative dissociation brought about by the 
circumstances of an individual’s experience and his different aims, 
we sometimes describe him as possessing more than one self. The 
self of working hours is not the same in his mental content and 
practical attitude as the self at leisure, or the self engaged in 
social duties. When one self is uppermost, the others tend to be 
more or less submerged, to fall into the subconscious flow of 
mental life. But given opportunity the selves become one. For 
instance the self of serious interests may or may not be active 
in social intercourse, in any case its presence affects such 
intercourse, by it, though it is submerged, we measure the mental 
capacity of the individuals with whom we come into contact.
Such dissociation as that indicated above is, of course, 
slight, the varying trends of consciousness connected with the 
normal interests of life are never far apart.
5. We have spoken of the "subconscious flow of mental life" and
we know that outside the field of attention there is always present
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a background of impressiona which lie within the margin of 
attention. We become aware of the existence of such subcon­
scious contents when these change or become intense and so 
come into focus.
Hypnotic experiment has extended our knowledge of the 
subconscious regions of the mind. Through such experiment 
we realise that there are submerged streams of consciousness 
containing memories of the individual’s past and capable of 
intelligent activity. In hypnosis the submerged contents are 
dissociated from the subject’s normal states.. Normally, we need 
not doubt, they influence clear consciousness and come into 
focus when relevant. The hypnotised subject remembers his 
experience on waking if it is suggested that he should do so, 
or some associated object may revive all the events of the 
hypnotic state.
Subconsciousness is also the guardian and director of our 
habits. It takes over those reactions which exercise has ren­
dered more or less perfect, and for which full consciousness 
is unnecessary, guiding and adapting these reactions for the 
most part without the intervention of conscious attention.
The limits of subconsciousness are not fixed. The con­
scious centre widens and narrows, and sometimes shifts altogether, 
so that what is subconscious at one time may be within the focus 
of consciousness at another.
In any case the submerged contents continuously feed and 
colour the conscious stream. From the outlying regions come
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ideas which may enrich the central flow, or divert it from its 
course, numerous relevant and irrelevant fancies are constantly 
entering consciousness. Again consciousness ignores the 
impressions which subconsciousness accepts, and transmits when 
it can gain attention. For example, we hear the remark of another 
in moments of concentration some time after it is actually made, 
and an impulse whose meaning is not grasped sets us moving 
about some task which we discover we have in fact been asked 
to perform. We cease striving and the forgotten word rises 
spontaneously into consciousness. We find again and again 
that what is disregarded and forgotten is not lost.
But subconsciousness takes more complex tasks in hand than 
these.
6. Our intelligence and our knowledge are greater than can be
realised in any temporary effort of concentration. In moments 
of strenuous work we reap the fruit of much subconscious 
elaboration. Much of our thought we receive, we may say, in 
a final stage. Its actual working out having never reached full 
consciousness. We are aware of this subconscious capacity, no 
doubt, and that is why in getting up any information or working 
at some given problem we read as widely and deeply as we can.
For the same reason we dislike to be hurried in any intellectual 
task, we need time for all kinds of elaboration, and we find in 
introspection that the time spent in active mental effort is not 
so great. In reading and discussion how little seems relevant 
to selective attention to the work in hand, how much more is
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apparent In the accomplished task!
So we find enlightenment on unsolved problems and abandoned 
tasks after intervals of what was apparently mere revery -emd 
relaxation.
The inspirations of genius are examples, doubtless, of such 
subconscious working. According to the accounts of many creative 
artists their creations appear objectively before them, and they 
themselves are relatively passive. Thus, Dante’s great poem is 
the narration of a vision. Mozart describes his musical creations 
as coming to him as a whole, which he hears altogether and has 
merely to write down. Georges Sand, Schiller and Dumas all 
watched and waited for the evolution of the characters they had 
created.
The purpose and value of mental concentration remain,however 
these may be assisted by subconsciousness. The conscious aim 
of mental endeavour guides and controls the processes concerned 
in it, without active consciousness the results of subconscious 
selection and association would be useless because unorganised.
The contents of subconsciousness are valuable only in their 
relation to full consciousness. As so related subconsciousness 
makes for economy of mental activity. It supplies contents con­
nected with the contents of upper consciousness, working out much 
of these in a less accessible region, it keeps us in touch during 
periods of concentrated thought with the external world, it serves 
as a continual storehouse of ideas, the foundations of our know­
ledge being thus invariably broader and deeper than its conscious 
products.
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7. If suboonsciousnesB plays an Important part in intellectual
life as we have maintained, its role in our affective life is 
even more far-reaching and fundamental#
We will not consider here the effect of the organic feelingfi, 
the general feeling tone derived from the bodily sensations, pro­
found as it probably is in determining temperament, and therefore 
to a great extent our general outlook on life.
We will consider subconscious working in relation to the 
sentiments.
Our sentiments, as we have seen, are systems of feelings 
bound up with some controlling idea, they are essential elements 
of character and the origin of our judgments of worth.
The work of our sentiments is in a great measure subconscious, 
they pervade our habits, contain our motives and issue inevitably 
in conduct, but we obey them rather than analyse them.  ^For they 
baffle analysis to a great extent because of their affective 
character. It is not implied by this statement that feelings 
are only subjective and cannot be an object of thought, as certain 
psychologists have maintained, but only that they are more obscure 
than other contents of consciousness. Nor is full consciousness 
necessary to their activity. For the most part we attempt no 
examination of our desires and motives, we can hardly doubt that 
we are guided and controlled by them. Their constant presence 
in consciousness would interfere with activity, and their affective 
elements tend to find an outlet in impulsive acts which, though 
satisfying for the moment, would have no bearing on consciousness
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aa a whole. Our sentiments cannot be grasped by any conscious 
act, for they are not static and their content is too full. Our 
motives and judgments of value which have their roots in our 
sentiments are also too numerous and continuous for conscious 
investigation. A series of impressions may call forth such 
subconscious judgments whose result is a conscious and fixed 
attitude towards some individual or question, the growth of which 
consciousness had never been the witness.
Our sentiments come into focus more prominently on occasions 
of some important decision, we may realise clearly then that our 
sympathies are too deeply involved in some given direction to maket 
a suggested course possible to us.
For the most part they arise in consciousness in the shape 
of hopes, which are perhaps but complex desires,and ideals.
How completely these are bound up with our deeper emotional life 
we may realise when we consider how vigorous they are in spite 
of the actual issue of events. Our hopes centre about every 
contemplated act and situation and, deferred and even shattered 
in the outcome, they arise with an irresistible want of logic 
and flourish anew. They cannot die, for they ape the conscious 
demands of our very sèlves. Their final vindication depends on 
the strength and coherence of the sentiments of which they are 
the offspring. If these are sufficiently strong and well or­
ganised our hopes and ideals will in the end transform and find 
some satisfaction in actualities.
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8. Because our sentiments are in part subconscious they are
open to suggestions which the critical centre of consciousness 
if active would exclude. The danger is increased if the ideas 
which are the intellectual side of our sentiments are vaguely 
conceived. So pride may ape humility, and purely selfish 
considerations appear as altruistic motives.
The organisation of our sentiments with regard to each 
other is equally important for moral character. In hypnosis 
the dissociation of the consciousness of the subject makes him 
extremely suggestible. And if our sentiments are dissociated, 
one sentiment may accept suggestions which are opposed to a not 
less important side of character. The party politician under 
the influence of party interests may thus complacently and 
unconsciously part with his honour by betraying the confidence 
of the people he represents. The dissociation indicated 
explains many anomalies and inconsistentiea of character, and 
no character is completely related and unified, but it may be so 
• to a very great degree, and harmonious character and conduct 
• are only possible where there is considerable unity.
The meaning of the dominant ideas of our sentiments, 
therefore, should be understood before they are accepted.
And not only should the dominant ideas be the object of conscious 
selection, but they should be consciously associated with other 
mental contents. Through reflection feeling itself becomes 
enlightened, it follows the analysis of Intelligence and
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affective dispositions grow up not only in connection with the 
dominant idea itself, but with its associated ideas and tendencies 
and if such an association is rational the emotional dispositions 
and desires issue in consistent action, and so subconscious 
dispositions work in the direction indicated by consciousness.
9. The problem for education here is the less difficult in
that the educator has opportunities not only for continually 
influencing the affective life of children, but because he may 
in a great measure actually form their sentiments.
For the child has had neither the time nor the capacity to 
acquire these stable forms of feelings and ideas that we have des- 
cribèd as sentiments. We have seen that an idea is suggestive 
in so far as it ihhibits contrariant ideas. The child has too 
few ideas and these are too fluid and illogical for them to 
offer resistance to new ones even if the former were antagonistic. 
Further he is through his imitâtiveness being continually brought 
into a passive, suggestible ’frame of mind. At school he imitates 
the movements and behaviour of the other children, and so is con­
tinually attending to the teacher and obeying his commands. 
Suggestions of many kinds are daily pouring in upon him, these 
accepted unconsciously for the most part become habits of thought 
and conduct. Thus the tone of the school becomes as natural 
to him as the air he breathes,-the manners" of the other scholars 
their attitude towards the teachers, each other and their neigh­
bours, at first merely imitated, and hardly heeded, grow to be
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part of his very being, and form the bases of the social, habits 
of later life.
10. The older child is less suggestible, because he possesses
numerous ideas, and his sentmments are in part organised. With 
him and with adults indirect suggestion is more effective. A 
suggestion is indirect when its purpose is not stated and not, 
therefore, consciously realised by the recipient of the suggestion. 
Direct suggestion is apt to appear obtrusive, it then rouses re­
sentment, due perhaps to outraged dignity. In this case even if 
in accord with actual feelings it has little chance of reaching 
them and being incorporated with them.
An indirect suggestion if in sympathy with actual sentiments 
 ^ gains admittance within the mental contents that can be associated 
with it, and the indirect suggestion has generally more possibility 
of association than the direct and so can make a wider and stronger 
appeal.
The futility of drmwlng morals In instruction becomes apparent. 
Apart from personality and circumstances how barren is the noble 
deed, and what an alien countenance virtue wears bereft of fancy 
and the glow of life. The ideal presented, not as a banal 
platitude, but in a rich context, has many points of appeal, 
it gives not only ideas, but stirs imagination and feeling, and 
. is therefore, almost bound to come into contact with our sentiments 
This is, perh^p^, why the poets are such suggestive moral teachers.
The claims upon our mental life from without are infinitely
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various and unceasing, the bulk of impressions, fortunately 
for our mental capacity and endurance are ignored or forgotten.
Only suggestions which succeed in flowing with the current of 
our organised affective life gain sufficient support and permanence
within consciousness to influence character. That is to say,
only suggestions which become auto-suggestions are morally valuable.
11, There are,however, ideas which may dominate the whole person­
ality by awakening strong sentiments. If these ideas cover a 
sufficiently wide field of possible endeavour they make for
harmony and consistency of character. .
An aesthetic ideal combined with capacity to express it satisfies 
the conditions,
Schumann says, "I feel myself affected by all that goes on 
in the world . . .  men, politics, literature; I reflect 
on all that in my own way and it issues outwards in the form of 
music." (Ribot, The Creative Imagination, p.215.)
Similarly a moral or religious ideal may gather about it 
unified and permanent sentiments, for these ideals can enter into 
almost every aspect of life and attitude of consciousness. And 
though naturally any development or change in our deeper interests 
is apt to be a slow process, under the influence of moral and 
religious ideals apparently abrupt and complete changes of 
character do occur. In such cases the individual responds to 
the ideal with all the forces within him, thefts subconscious 
elements so emotionllly tinged rise up and claim the individual as 
their own. Such a change makes for unity of sentiments and
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purposes, and when the centralising idea is a religious one 
we call it conversion.
40
CHAPTER III.
The Influence of Suggestion In Conversion.
.1
Sect. 1. The nature of conversion.
.. 2. Conversion and adolescence.
.. 3. Internal motives for the change.
.. 4. External motives.
«. 5. Examples of conversion. References to
subconscious working.
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1. When we try to consider in what after all the change
implied in conversion consists, it would seem that we may 
answer in the words of Ribot, "On peut en conclure que toute 
conversion est une alteration partielle de la pereonalité dans 
ses elements affectifs." (La Logique des Sentiments, p. 85.)
For the intellectual equipment of the converted individual is 
very much what it was before the beginning of the new life, he 
remembers his past, he uses the old knowledge and ideas, the 
change is in the connection and direction of certain of his 
ideas, they have now a different emotional setting, and therefore 
carry him to new purposes. The change goes deeper than the 
intellect, it is a change in character. Many of the old ideas 
are, therefore, repudiated; the difference lies not in them as 
ideas, but in the individual’s attitude towards them, what was 
attractive now repels, what was Indifferent is,now delightful.
"To be converted, to be regenerated, to receive grace, to 
experience religion, to gain an assurance, are so many phrases 
which denote the process, gradual or sudden, by which a self 
hitherto divided, and consciously wrong, inferior and unhappy, 
becomes unified and consciously right, superior and happy, in 
consequence of its firmer hold on religious realities." (W. 
James, Varieties of Religious Experience, p. 189.)
The interest of this definition lies in the fact that it 
emphasises not merely the change brought about by conversion.
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but tho unity of the self which is the result of the change.
2. Dr. Stanley Hall and Dr. Starbuck in their treatment of
conversion show that it la a phenomenon of adolescence. If
we consider the meaning of this experience it becomes clear that 
young children lack the constancy of purpose and mental capacity 
necessary for a new and thorough-going outlook on life. Nor has 
conversion anything to do for them. Change is itself a too con­
stant and valuable feature of their lives for it to set in one 
direction and allow them to close accounts with any one aspect 
of life.
On the other hand conversion is less an experience of 
individuals of maturer years than of adolescents because the 
latter are more unstable, impressionable and enthusiastic than 
their elders. The convictions of adults are apt to be too settled 
and rigid to suffer change. The experience of conversion is, 
however, not confined to adolescents, and seems to have occurred 
in the case of famous converts when they were very near maturity.
3. Adolescence is naturally enough a period for the awakening
of new interests. These may be intellectual, artistic, practical 
and social. Such interests are not necessarily permanent, unless 
the child has some real capacity in a given direction, they are 
probably not. The child rather takes them up, and throws himself 
into one or more of them for a time, and then drops it for others. 
Such lines of development are frequently not important in them-
, selves, but make clear the fact that the boy or girl is seeking
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some activity that will absorb his energies and give satisfaction 
to the new sense of his own individuality. It is quite possible, 
then, that for the first time a religious ideal may fascinate 
and excite his imagination, and thereafter exert a permanent in­
fluence. Or he may turn to religion for comfort. The adolescent, 
in endeavouring to bring into relation with actualities his 
dreams and untried ideals, inevitably suffers disappointment 
with himself and his world, and religion not only probably gives 
opportunity to play an active and interesting part in life, but 
promises a lasting consolation for his real and imagined troubles.
Religion offers a centre from which he can survey himself 
and the universe with composure and good faith, for it is con­
cerned with the Eternal Reality which contains the individual 
and the universe. If the religious ideal can be accepted it 
to steady and utilise the new emotional and intellectual 
capaoity of the adolescent, hastening the maturing of character 
that years must in any case bring. It has, therefore, an econom­
ical value apart from its further results,
"There are forces in human life and its surroundings," 
writes Starbuck, "which tend to break the unity and harmony 
of consciousness; and its unity once destroyed, the contrast 
between what is, and what might be, gives birth to ideals and 
sets two selves in sharp opposition to each other." (The 
Psychology of Religion, p. 155.)
The sharp opposition we may regard as the immediate cause 
of conversion, and some of the forces leading up to it have
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already been indicated.
It would appear perhaps surprising, that since such forces 
must be present in almost every life, conversion is not a more 
common experience. But though the majority of Individuals 
are aware of two selves, a real and an ideal, the opposition 
between them is not sharp but faint, the ideal self is too pale 
 ^ a shadow in comparison with the real to be an effective stimulus 
to change, and the real self is too full and satisfying a per­
sonality to be given up.
V/e need not be surprised, therefore, that "conversion is a 
process of struggling away from sin, rather than of striving 
towards righteousness." (Ibid., p. 64.)
The sense of sin is the driving force that makes the 
individual heal the division between the two selves, for its 
pressure on consciousness is too great, its presence too con­
tinuous for any possible satisfaction with the real self.
The sense of sin had no necessary connection with definite 
wrong-doing, the causes are to a great extent subconscious.
The loss of illusions and an accumulation of disappointments 
may be very gradual and not consciously realised. Their effects, 
however, are real, and leave their mark on consciousness, in 
the shape perhaps of a general depression and loss of a hopeful 
attitude of mind. In time the individual is bound to become 
aware of his own discouraged outlook, but he is not able to 
trace its growth and causes, and cannot refer these to their 
real source, for he has never been fully conscious of them.
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He may refer hia unhappiness entirely to inner sources, if he 
uses theological terms he probably describes it as a sense of sin. 
It is inevitable that the ideal of a happier, more satisfactory 
self must arise, and that all suggestions connected with such a 
self will gain acceptance.
The form which that self will take is decided by his 
training and surroundings. If these are religious, or if religious 
influences reach him in any way now a religious self becomes the 
ideal self.
4. Indeed the force of an exemplary religious life may initiate
the whole experience. The contrast between one individual and 
another may serve as the spring of an ideal self. In this case, 
too,,the ideal is the result of many subconscious judgments which 
emerge suddenly and clearly in consciousness. Thus the process 
of conversion is probably much less abrupt than it appears, and 
when the change is real and permanent we can hardly doubt that 
it is largely the gradual work of subconscious influences.
Emotional disturbance of a striking kind may be the exciting 
cause of a conversion it is true. And it is not necessarily less 
real for that, since the process once started may work itself out 
in regeneration. But as a rule strong emotional excitement is 
not an affective stimulus. For it cannot last, and if its object 
has no attraction for the individual in his normal condition, ' 
fades with the emotion. Thus revival meetings may reduce a 
congregation to what is practically a state of hypnosis. They
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are, then, of course, in a state of extreme suggestibility, 
and may be completely swayed by the preacher. A strong appeal 
is made to the emotions which when excited inhibit intellectual 
activity, at the same time the attention of the congregation 
is turned expectantly upon the preacher who may thus give any 
suggestions in line with the emotions aroused. The effect is 
greatly increased by the behaviour of the crowd, the individuals 
who compose it imitate each other, their emotions are thus height 
ened, if one individual makes a confession of faith, the most 
suggestible tend to follow hia example. The rhythm of music 
may add a further hypnotic influence by lulling the congregation 
into acquiescence. If conversion, due to the work of imitation, 
suggestion and emotional excitement, follows, it can hardly have 
much bearing on the inner needs of an individual, and is very 
likely not permanent in its results. For the value attached to 
a religious life under such influences is lacking when viewed 
in a calmer mood, since it has no real connection with his 
ordinary consciousness.
Yet, as many people have little critical power, they may 
continue to attach profound importance to the emotional stir 
of a revival meeting, and maintain what is apparently a sincere 
interest in religion in tho hope of reviving the exciting ex­
perience until habit has made religion a necessary part of their 
lives. It is interesting to consider such well known examples 
of conversion aa those of Bunyan, Fox and Wesley.
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5* Bunyan and Fox ahow us ideas arising in subconsciousness
and issuing in auto-suggestion.
Bunÿan had apparently always an exaggerated view of his own
shortcomings, even in childhood. He was given up to folly,
lying and blasphemy according to his own account, and was aware
of his iniquity. He is very early, then, a divided self. How
strongly the ideal self was working in subconsciousness we may
see in the incidents he relates. For instance he is struck to
the heart by some: remarks made by an old woman of his acquaintance
on his habit of swearing, thougli he has little respect for the
*
character of his critic. Then he hears by chance some religious 
women talking together, and comes into contact with a godly man.
He is profoundly interested and instructed by their conversation, 
and begins to study the Bible and attend Church, not having yet 
grasped the weaknesses of the Church, nor as he tells us, changed 
in heart. The change of heart is a long and painful process.
When the ideal self gains the field, Bunyan is tormented by sug­
gestions from the old self. Thus a suggestion that he is not 
saved may suddenly occur. The method of attack and defence is 
curious. Evil suggestions sometimes arise as and are generally 
refuted by spontaneous utterances from the Scriptures. Bunyan 
made a very thorough study of the Bible, so this is explicable. 
Having passed through a stage of believing that he has committed 
the unpardonable sin he finds extraordinary comfort in the words, 
"Thy righteousness is in heaven" (I Cor., 1., 50.)
"Now did my chains fall off my legs indeed," he writes, "I
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was loosed from affliction and irons; my temptations also fled 
away; so from that time, those dreadful Scriptures of God left 
off to trouble me, now went I home rejoicing for the Grace and 
love of God." (Grace Abounding.)
But in spite of this triumph Bunyan never attains complete 
unity, from subconscious regions whisperings arise suggesting 
temptations and doubts, and he closes his confession on a 
gloomy note with the words. "I find to this daySeven abominations 
in my heart."
George Fox’s experience has a happier tone. He was of a 
serious turn of mind from a child. In early manhood he became 
dissatisfied with the religious teaching of hie time. He visited 
clergymen in order to discuss religious matters and learn from 
them. The result was quite barren for himself. Indeed he assisted 
one priest who preached on Sunday what Fox had said to him on a 
weekday. "For this," says Fox with some simplicity, "I did not 
like him." As those to whom he appealed completely failed him,
I
Fox was thrown back upon himself, and naturally, when we consider 
his desire for understanding and his constant preoccupation with 
religion, found comfort.
"%hen all my hopes in them (priests) and all men were gone,
30 that I had none outwardly to help me, nor could I tell what 
to do, then, 0! then, I heard a voice which said, "There is one, 
even Christ Jesus, that can speak to thy condition," and when I 
heard it my heart did leap for joy." (Pox’s Journal). The 
spontaneous comfort and direction he experienced were no doubt
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subconBOlO'UQ elaborations of the dominant idea of his mental 
life, but were regarded by him as openings” of God.
Finally he is impelled to take up the work of saving others.
”I was commanded to go abroad into the world to bring 
people into the way of truth.”
Wesley's conversion is an instance of what Ribot describes 
as the logic of the feelings.
”Dans la logique des sentiments . . . la conclusion
est toujours determines d'avance, au moins virtuellement."
(Ribot, La Logique des Sentiments, p. 67.)
Wesley, a priest for many years and engaged in the duties 
of his office, became convicted of unbelief owing to the con­
versation of a Moravian named Peter Bohler. Wesley doubted if 
he could continue to preach while he himself was unconvinced 
of the doctrine of faith.
Bohler replied, "Preach faith till you have it, and then 
because you have it you will preach faith." (Wesley's Journal.)
It is clear that Wesley was already a believer in the 
doctrine, but it was too new for him to grasp the fact. He 
followed Bohler's advice, preached all over the country, and 
attracted large crowds. We then find him pointing to the 
results of his own preaching as proofs of the doctrine he had 
preached.
We may, then, regard conversion as an experience which 
results in a relative harmony of character. The mystics attain 
a more complete unity of life by a method in which emotion and
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auto-suggestion play a more obvious part, and in particular by 
means of a peculiar and deeply affective experience which they 
term union, through which the centre of consciousness shifts, 
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1. Schopenhauer speaks of the surprising i agreement in the
thought of the mystics, surprising in consideration of the 
differences of their time, race, and creed. They express one 
meaning, and their thought and even their language is echoed 
by the poets. Indeed it would not perhaps be difficult to show 
that mystical truths have never failed " to touch a chord and 
wake a sigh" in the heart of every individual who can even faintly 
grasp them, and to say with Maeterlinck, that the truths of 
mysticism can neither grow old nor die, and that a book lives 
in so far as it is mystical.
/
In attempting to analyse the writings of any mystic the 
reader feels that the mystic's truths are almost inexpressible, 
in part by the writer, still more so by the observer; for such 
writings describe am individual experience whose nature and 
reality are not to be fully expressed in words, and further the 
expression may not only veil the experience, but for the outsider
lit
may misrepresent, for neither the experience nor language is his. 
In comparison with what the mystics themselves say certainly any 
definition of their doctrine must appear inadequate : and bdld.
That doctrine asserts the unity of being and ultimate reality, 
the reality of inner experience, and the fact that the individual 
can become possessed of reality. Yet this phrase possessed of 
reality does not describe the mystical state. For as a modern
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mystic says, "it is not enough to possess the truth, but the 
trith must possess us." In this experience the antithesis between 
subject and object fades, knowledge and faith vanish, as it were, 
into sight. The immediacy of the experience is too the hall-mark 
of its truth and reality. The mystics do not know truth and reality, 
they realise them directly.
The oneness of reality, and the reality of the individual, 
not as such but as an expression of the unified being, are stated 
clearly enough by the mystics themselves in such sayings as
"Thou art Thou"of the Upanishads, and in the teaching of Buddha
\
that Nirvana, the highest possible state of truth and'.bliss| 
could be attained by the individual in this present life.
Plato speaks the same mystical language concerning the Beautiful 
and the Good in the Phaedrus and the Republic. Plotinus, in 
describing the knowledge of the One, says, "There were not two 
things, but the perceiver was one with the thing perceived, 
as not being vision but union."
Christian mystics express the same thought, though their 
mysticism is perhaps less sympathetic because more dogmatic.
They too are what they know and know what they are.
The state in which mystics realise the truth has been described 
as ecstasy, a word which appears to have unfortunate pathological 
associations.
It must be admitted that mysticism also has pathological as­
sociations. The experiences described by the mystics are 
abnormal, their abnormality v/e can hardly doubt is in part due
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to a loss of mental control. Their frequently artificially 
• produced weakness did, perhaps at times, give rise to the state 
of ecstasy to which they ascribed such worth. For those who 
were ascètics their asceticism, no doubt, tinged all their 
experiences. But these undertones and overtones of suffering 
are not what is essential and universal in mysticism. Not all 
the mystics were neurotic or sickly. And if they were so the 
normal individual would have to admit that in abnormal states 
truths may be felt that the normal individual cannot fail 
to reverence and cherish. But in actual fact those who have 
uttered mystical truths were not all ascetics, unless a relative 
indifference to material goods imply ascetism .
It is to the purpose to examine the state of mystical ecstasy, 
and to consider how it is related to other states and rather to 
conscious life as a whole.
2. Mr Leuba states that an important characteristic of the mystics
is their inwardmindedness. They are more sensitive than most
I
individuals, to sensations, ideas and feelings of subjective origin. 
(On the Psychology of a Group of Christian Mystics, Mind,N.S., 
vol 14.)
This statement is interesting not only because it is borne 
out by the descriptions of the mystics themselves, but also 
because it is in itself a partial explanation of their experience.
Thus the mystic appears as a host in himself, doubts and 
difficulties do not exist for him as for others, he dwells in 
certainty and peace.
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All mystics do not, of course, admit that their experiences 
are of subjective origin,but modern mystics tend to do so, and 
find their experience not less valuable on that account. On the 
contrary, the idea of Richard Jeffries* life was to pray for the 
fullest soul life, and by prayer he means intense soul emotion, 
intense aspiration. "So great is the value of the soul that it 
seems to me, if the soul lived and received its aspirations it 
would not matter if the material universe melted away as snow."
(The Story of my Heart,p./yl)
A further striking characteristic of the mystic is his 
demand for inner unity, and for complete understanding of his 
relations with the infinite. It is the part of mysticism, accord­
ing to Recejac, to make a mental synthesis. (The Mystic Basis of 
Knowledge.)
It is not, of course, claimed that the mystics alone demand 
inner unity, and endeavour to make a mental synthesis. All in­
dividuals make some effort to arrive at unity with and under­
standing of their world. But in the mystics this demand is 
unusually strong. It is its strength which gives them some 
creative power, and is in many cases their sole claim to originality
For this desire to possess truth and the ability to achieve 
in some sense its fulfilment are marks of all original minds.
But all do not seek their goal in the same direction. Some find 
it in the external world, others in some form of self-expression, 
the mystic looks within. And like the latter, all must form a 
synthesis in part by elimination and exclusion.
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It Is Important to emphasise one undeniable fact, that the 
mystic is well prepared for what he describes as a union with, 
a fuller knowledge of God or the Real apart from any peculiarities 
of his mental constitution.
For the mystic does not turn in upon himself without aim 
or motive, he seeks within him an object of supreme worth whose 
value he has learned through tradition, education and reflection, 
apart from any mystical revelations. He knows, however indefin­
itely, what he seeks and what he shall find. The objective 
centre of the mystical experience of individuals of different 
faiths is never the same, though the processes through .which' they 
realise it are very similar. The Buddhist seeks Nirvana, the 
Christian mystic the God of his faith, Plotinus the One. This 
object, being of supreme value to the mystic, is never completely 
absent from his thoughts. When not the direct object of thought 
and devotion, it is in the background, colouring all his ideas, 
feelings and actions. It gives importance and meaning to every 
moment of his life.
The mystic because of his inwardmindedness looks within him­
self for the solution of his difficulties. The certainty of 
finding the truth, and of finding it within, and some of the 
psychological conditions of attaining it are plainly stated in 
the following passage.
"It would be monstrous to believe for a moment that the 
mind was unable to perceive ideal truth exaotlÿ as it is, and 
that we had not certainty and knowledge of the world of
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intelligence. It follows, therefore, that this region of truth 
is not to be investigated as a thing external to us, and so only
imperfectly known. It is within us.............................
The wise man recognises the idea of good within him. This he 
develops by withdrawal into the holy place of his own soul. He 
who does not understand how the soul contains the beautiful 
within itself, seeks to realise beauty without by laborious 
production. His aim should rather be to concentrate and simplify, 
and so to expand his being; instead of going out into the manifold, 
to forsake it for the One, and so to float upwards towards the 
divine fount of being whose stream flows within him." (Plotinus 
to Flaccus, Vaughan, Hours with the Mystics, vol. 1.)
5. With this end in view the mystic passes into a state of
ecstatic contemplation of the divine reality, all other objects, 
sensible and ideal, fade from his field of consciousness. As 
the stream of consciousness narrows, the object looms larger, 
the subject makes no effort, he lets his states bear him where 
they will. His state is one of repose, striving and discursive 
thought cease, the object is beyond argument and beyond action, 
the mystic rests in it, the self is in abeyance, driven out by 
the object.
The subject does not feel that his consciousness is narrowed. 
On the contrary, to him there is a generous flow, an unusual 
expansion. And this is natural, for his mental processes succeed 
one another without obstacle on the objective side, and without 
inhibition on the subjective side. To the subject the state is
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almost completely satisfying. The affective state is highly 
pleasurable. The effortless ease with which his consciousness 
flows is greatly enhanced by the fact that the object is one of 
love and reverence to the mystic, and it is obvious that it must 
assume immense proportions if striving, reason, consciousness of 
self are inactive. It does so, it fills the mystic’s whole 
horizon, he is lost in it, his familiar self vanishes, and he 
feels that he has become one with the object, God has entered 
into him.
The object in this experience does not remain completely 
static. Otherwise the subject would lose consciousness. This 
he sometimes does, but it is not during periods of unconscious­
ness that he has experiences interesting to himself or anyone 
else.
The object shifts and changes with the current of the 
mystic’s consciousness. It speaks to the subject, flashes more 
definite glimpses of itself upon him. So he hears voices and sees 
visions at times in the state of ecstasy. For in this state as 
in all associations, however fugitive and slight, are formed, the 
mental contents of one process awaken ideas which form the mental 
contents of subsequent processes.
What is peculiar to the mystical experience is that the 
subject does not recognise the ideas suggested as his own, but 
regards them as due to the divine object of his state. All the 
satisfactory aspects of his state are also considered as in some 
way attributes of the object or its effects. The subject is
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consolons of his own passivity, the occurrences are quite 
irrespective of his thought and will, moreover they are unusual
and unfamiliar. V/e may attempt to sum up from this description
the characteristic, features of the state of mystical ecstasy.
It at once appears that the mystic follows the directions 
of Plotinus. The former does concentrate and simplify, and, at 
least to his own consciousness, expand his being.
Further we may say; -
The mystic’s consciousness is concentrated on a single idea, 
that of the Infinite or eternal. Absorbed in this idea, he
arrives at an immediate contact and union with the infinite.
The powers of discrimination weaken and become almost in­
operative.
Conative tendencies are almost completely absent. The sub­
ject feels himself passive, his sense of individuality is lost.
The affective states grow and expand, and may range from a 
feeling of repose and happiness to keen pleasure. (See appendix.)
4. Ribot regards the state of mystical ecstasy as a disease of
the will. There is an extreme narrowing of the field of conscious­
ness, a single presentation possesses it and becomes increasingly 
Intense. The will disappears, there is some intellectual Intensity 
with conative nullity. There is nothing that can will or be willed 
because of the narrowing of consciousness. Feeling at the same 
time intensifies to the point of rapture. (Maladies de la Volonté, 
ch. V. )
Godfernaux defines this state as a form of dissociation between
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thought and feeling. The affective state grows and intensifies, 
thought disappears. Further he describes ecstasy as a direct 
intuition of the not me. (Sodfernaux, Le Sentiment et la Pensee, 
ch. IV.) This is hard to reconcile with the disappearance of 
thought, and it is also difficult to understand how the mystic 
could acquire such an intuition when absorbed in his own states.
Delacroix and Boutroux give a more sympathetic analysis of 
the psychology of the mystics. They consider mystical experience 
not only in its beginnings, but its effects. Ecstasy is not 
final, but a stage, though the one of supreme importance, in a 
progressive development of character. Both writers take account 
of the part played by subconsciousness in this state.
The mystic, for Boutroux as for Ribot, is dominated by a 
single idea. It is, says the former, the idea of the infinite, 
the eternal as the superior object of desires which rises from 
the subconsciousness to consciousness. The problem for the 
mystic is to transform this idea into a sentiment, a principle 
of action. This endeavour la realised in ecstasy, which is the 
union of the soul with its object. The mystic has an intuition 
of the greatly desired object,the result is happiness, for his 
yearnings are satisfied. The transformation of idea through feel­
ing into an intuition of the infinite has permanent effects. The 
idea becomes a sentiment of compelling power, through which a 
redirection is given to judgment and conduct, and the everyday 
life of the mystic is transfigured, partly by means of this newly 
developed sentiment, partly through his powers of contemplation.
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For Boutroux suggests that there Is a superior, universal 
existence and that the individual may share it by developing his
intuitive powers. (La Psychologie du Mysticism, Revue Bleue,
1
March, 1902.)
The whole series of processes is explained by Boutroux 
through the dominance of the single idea of the eternal and 
auto-suggestion. It is through the latter that the dominant 
idea becomes the active principle of the mystic’s life.
Delacroix’s analysis of the mystic’s psychology is more 
detailed and complete, but it is similar in some important 
features already indicated to that of Boutroux. The mysticism 
of the oases Delacroix studies is, he says, a method of the 
transformation of the personality. The natures that possess a 
rich subconscious life and are disposed towards passivity can 
lose themselves in an intuition of the divine which awakens in 
them a strongly affective state, and finally invades their whole 
life. (Etudes dù Mysticisme. )
The last two writers give a more satisfactory account of 
the relation of the ecstatic experience to the mystic’s conscious 
life as a whole. But we must admit that this experience is the 
result of a dissociation of consciousness, and with Ribot that 
it is the active tendencies that are, therefore, inhibited. We 
are thus able to explain the characteristic features of ecstasy 
already noted.
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5. We need not suppose that the mystic does discover the
reality and union with that reality that he claims. He has in 
seeking the divine found himself. But it is a strange and unfami­
liar self, for he has reached a different levèl of consciousness, 
the subconscious level. The ideas and images that arise are 
indeed his own, he does not recognise them because they come 
from depths unknown, unstirred before. And because the contents 
of the mystical state have not the habitual familiar appearance 
of the ordinary stream of consciousness he refers them to an 
external cause.
The feeling of union of which the mystic speaks is not 
altogether an illusion. He becomes one with his subconsciousness. 
It is not strange, perhaps, that the ideas that belong to 
subconsciousness should possess an affinity with himself.
It is to be noted that for the most part the mystics bring 
back little that can be definitely expressed and described 
from their ecstatic condition. They have had an illuminating, 
remarkable and supremely valuable experience, of that they are 
sure, but they give no clear account of its contents. The 
mystic is ready enough to admit this, silence speaks better than 
words for him, the experience is inexpressible and concerned 
with the inexpressible.
It is possible to find another explanation of this silence . 
On the whole the mystic in this state has very limited objective 
contents, his mind is turned upon his inner life, he follows
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the movements of his own processes, these processes must have 
content, sometimes that content is the mystic’s own condition, 
he realises his own passivity, peace and satisfaction, at times 
the content changes, some obscure idea emerges and grows clearer. 
He then has flashes of insight which do not seem due to himself. 
But these contents are much less full and clear than normal ones. 
There is, therefore, neither room for, nor purpose in the activity 
of association and conation. Feeling, thus set free and height­
ened by the mystic’s illusion as to the divine nature of his con­
dition, intensifies and may become overwhelming. The mystic float­
ing on a wider, stronger current of feeling than he has ever 
known is rendered more and more incapable of distinguishing his 
mental contents from himself, all is merged in a rapturous unity.
The experience leaves its mark upon the mystic. He has 
become in a sense infinite himself. He may roorgrd- himself as the 
instrument of the divine will which acts through him, and the 
divine wisdom which speaks through him. This is auto-suggestion. 
The mystic acts according to his own direction, carries out his 
own behests, and resists interference with his own plans, but 
because he feels as though he acts passively, because ideas arise 
in him spontaneously and he cannot trace their connection, he 
does not appear to himself to be their author. He feels himself 
to be living an impersonal life. This is an illusion, but the 
change in the mystic is real. The self is reorganised through 
having come into relation with subconsciousness, the ideas and 
suggestions of which are suffered to guide his conscious life.
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The mystic thus brings into unity his conscious and subconscious 
states. This unity is not, of course, complete, since he regards 
the suggestions of subconsciousness as external to himself.
6. It is an interesting and exceedingly difficult question
to enquire into the nature of mystic "intuition", a term which 
so many psychologists use in this connection.
In a moment of ecstasy the mystic has an illumination, 
an intuition of the nature of the real, at the same time he enters 
into union and becomes one with it. This intuition is not 
knowledge in the ordinary sense of the term, it is not reached by 
intellectual processes. On the.other hand it cannot be a state 
of feeling itself though accompanied by great exaltation of 
feeling. And it is probably the fulness of the accompanying 
affective states which makes the intuition so glowing and 
illuminative to the mystic.
The mystics sometimes explain intuition as a peculiar kind 
of knowledge by which alone we can know the absolute. So 
Plotinus writes:-
"You ask me how we can know the infinite? I answer, not 
by reason. It is the office of reason to distinguish and define. 
The infinite, therefore, cannot be ranked among its objects.
Yourean only apprehend the infinite by a faculty superior to 
reason, by entering into a state in which you are your finite 
self no longer, in which the divine essence is communicated to 
you. This is ecstasy."(Plotinus to Flaccus,Vaughan,op. cit.,vol I) 
It seems arbitrary to introduce a special kind of knowledge.
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Yet the existence of intuitions is a fact of ordinary experience, 
and knowledge of this instantaneous, incontrovertible kind is 
mentioned by others than mystics.
It appears that these intuitions must be of an intellectual 
character, it is impossible to imagine that a purely affective 
state without relation to Instinct intollob^ could guide and 
illuminate any consciousness. If the intuition is intellectual 
it is certainly not discursive and logical, it appears on its 
own merits, static and immediate.
It is quite possible, however, that its conditions are 
existent, and merely obscured or subconscious. Intuitions may 
thus be the unrecognised product of intellectual processes.
The fact that such ideas and promptings are absent from 
the habitual field of consciousness does not imply their miracu­
lous nature, nor their intellectual futility. They have been, 
perhaps, crowded out by other contents, too alien to them for the 
usual stream of consciousness to grasp and incorporate them; or 
perhaps they have been formed in the margin of consciousness and 
never had an opportunity of coming into its focus. Such con­
tents suffer through competition from others, but this competition 
with its resulting suppression of many ideas need not be taken 
to prove the worthlessness of such ideas. It merely implies 
that at any given moment these ideas were inopportune, would, 
perhaps, have claimed too much attention and so thrust out more 
immediately interesting and active ones. If then such failures 
arise in ecstasy or other enlightened moments, their
66
pronouncement may be more valid and vital than that of more 
habitual mental contents.
"The centre of consciousness, because it is primarily an 
adjusting apparatus, is often inadequate as an index to the 
entirety of life. The view of things from this point . 
must of necessity be partial. Thus, at times, it may be worth 
while for this central point to disintegrate, or its movement 
to be held in suspension, that the outlying regions, in so far 
as they represent one’s life in a truer perspective, may assert 
themselves. The religious r f of dying to one’s self and 
obtaining thereby a fuller or divine self is not at all without 
meaning, even though we may reject any mystical interpretation 
of the process." (Irving King, The Development of Religion, 
p. 327.) '
We may thus escape sometimes from mental stress and strain, 
and, coming in touch with a wider self and store of experience, 
take a clearer "prospect o ’er our being’s whole."
7. Mysticism has had important effects on the development of
religion. Religious reformers seem to have possessed more or 
less the mystical spirit. The statement of St. Paul. "I live, 
yet not I, but Christ liveth in me," expresses this spirit which 
enables them to insist on reforms, and to give new interpretations 
to the faith of their fathers with an apparently absolute authority.
There is another aspect of religious development which is 
connected with mysticism.
The intimate relation between morality and religion which
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exists in all developed religions must be regarded as an evolution 
of religion. Primitive man’s relations with supernatural forces 
did not imply a moral attitude in him. His gods demanded 
obedience, and inspired awe and fear, but did not speak to the 
hearts of men, and serve as a moral source and guide of their 
actions.
Religion in its early stages has at least indirectly moral 
effects, no doubt. For it is a social force, its gods are wor­
shipped by the tribe, and it enters into all forms of tribal 
activity. Religion thus makes for social harmony and tends to 
check strife.
It is also an exceedingly conservative Influence, it tends 
to give stability to the individuals among whom it is active, 
and tb preserve the stability attained. This is the natural 
result, not only of the sublime nature of its own sanctions, 
but of the generally closer connection between religion and state 
authority. In early times we frequently find that king and 
priest are one, and where their duties are performed by different 
individuals, the king, or other state authority, is assisted 
and supported by the priesthood.
But all religions have their mystics, and it appears that 
the example and influence of these may have been important factors 
in the development of religion from an external to an internal . 
moral force.
Indeed it is possible that the trances and ecstasies to 
which certain individuals are liable may have initiated religious
68.
ceremonies and practices, and even the religious attitude itself 
in themselves and others. In any case such an occurrence as an 
ecstatic trance would be an interesting and exciting event, and 
attention would be given to the probable resulting prophecy or 
claim of possession by spirits, and indded all the utterances 
of the gifted individual to whom it occurred. His utterances, 
though perhaps of little value, would emphasise the possibly 
Intimate relation between the divine power and man, and would 
suggest the probable efficacy of individual prayer and communion, 
and so tend to give the devotee an inner strength and a respect 
for individuals as such.
The mystics themselves, generally possessed by a sense of 
their mission as instruments of the divine will, are apt to 
adopt a mode of life which gives them opportunities of developing 
self-reliance and powers of contemplation which are impressive 
to their fellows. If we may take as an example the Jewish prophets, 
it becomes obvious that their wisdom and Integrity must have pro­
foundly affected the religious and moral life of their compatriots.
8. When we consider the lives of great mystics we find them
working for the salvation of souls with remarkable energy and 
singleness of purpose.
The founder of Buddhism, whose mysticism leads to the 
annihilation of all consciousness, yet quitted the pomp and 
circumstance of his state in order to find the way of truth, and 
after his efforts were crowned with success in his enlightenment 
under the Bo-tree, went forth to a life of active and continuous
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teaching.
Plato and Plotinus direct the philosopher, not only to 
contemplate the Good and the Beautiful, but to share their 
wisdom with others in a socially active life. The Christian 
mystics have reached great positions in the Church, become in­
fluential preachers and practical workers and founders of reli­
gious houses. James seems to regard their work as somewhat 
futile. While appreciating the capacity of St. Teresa and her 
devotion to her religious ideals, he writes: "Yet so j5ed±±dg
were these, according to our present way of thinking, that I 
confess my only feeling in reading her has been pity that so 
much vitality of soul should have found such poor employment." 
(The Varieties of Religious Experience, p. 546.) St. Teresa 
employed herself in founding monasteries, and was successful 
in getting them planned and erected in the face of great diffi­
culty.
We need not take a gloomy estimate of her labours if we 
consider the ideals of the times to which the saint belonged.
She had been less practical and saintly if such works had not 
appeared to her of supreme importance.
Yet James's criticism of the mystics is generous and sym­
pathetic. Even the "daft saints," are superior, he thinks, 
to the intellectually dead of another type.
We must certainly admit that mystics may differ in intellect 
and moral capacity. Mystical inspirations are not all of equal 
value. Maeterlinck gives an extreme example of this fact when
70.
he reminds us that Joan of Arc and Macbeth heard the same voices.
Works seem so essential a part of Christianity that the 
practical activity of Christian mystics is, perhaps, not surprising 
That such activity is persistent in the face of difficulties, 
that we find mystics of other creeds "practising the virtues," as 
St, Teresa describes it, are also not surprising if we return to 
the psychology of their states.
It is a psychological truism that ideas tend to work them­
selves out. "Our works fulfil our aspirations and our promises," 
to quote St. Teresa again.
9. The mystic is under the control of one idea, or at most a group 
of closely connected ideas, which is the object of his desires, 
and becomes not merely the ideal, but the real in the period of 
ecstasy. The illumination and the affective excitement of this 
state changes the idea to a sentiment, a passion, the principle 
by which the mystic lives. For it is clear that ecstasy must be
a transitory experience, it is equally clear that the central idea
of that experience does not vanish with it. The idea is not new
to the mystic, the habits of years of thought and feeling are
bound up with it, it is in part the spring of that transcendent 
experience which gives it an unquestionable meaning and worth.
The light and warmth of ecstasy may fade, but the experience 
is not forgotten, nor its attributes of love and authority. In 
his normal state the mystic treats the object of that experience 
as he does all his ideas, he associates it with other mental con­
tents, he elaborates it and works it out, it becomes less wonderful
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and more imperative. He must inevitably connect it with all 
those activities that custom and habit have taught him to think 
moral add necessary. Such a dominant idea must find outlets and 
expression. The mystic expresses it in whatever directions his 
capacity lies, and in whatever measure he possesses such capacity
The dominant idea controlling the mystic's consciousness 
makes for consistency and strength of character, and for moral 
character. For the idea that enwraps the mystic is the highest 
one he knows and his ideal is nearer attainment than that of most 
individuals because it is nearer to him, it is a permanent and 
insistent force. And the mystic too has a sure ground for 
reverencing his fellow creatures, since for him finite and in­
finite so intimately mingle. All this seems to be implied in 
Leuba's statement that with the mystics the ought is backed by 
a compelling motor force.
Further, the mystic has a fuller store, a wider source of 
inspiration on which to draw than more conventional individuals. 
He does not come into contact with the eternal, but he does have 
intuitions which transfigure his life. Ho is not the instrument 
of God, but spontaneous wisdom breathes in him as it does not in 
others. He gives himself leisure to possess his soul and to 
acquire self-reliance and strength. He looks within, his hidden 
wisdom speaks in intuitions that are clear and valuable. This 
hidden wisdom is no miracle, it is an acquired and tempered 
group of ideas and images which arise from a level lower than 
that of clear consciousness.
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The mystic may thus develop a fuller personality, since he 
brings into some relation and harmony consciousness and subcon­
sciousness. He is thus far less the creature of habit and cir­
cumstance than the ordinary individual who, though certainly 
not 80 obvious a case of auto-suggestion, is more suggestible 
to the external world, nor are these suggestions particularly 
well organised and effective, for on the whole he possesses less 
constancy of purpose than the mystic to deal with either his 
inner or his outer life.
The mystical consciousness, as we have endeavoured to in­
terpret it, is found in other individuals of superior gifts.
Ecstasy may have degrees, it may be overwhelming or slight, 
but intuition, and illumination and the strong desire for unity 
that makes it a necessity to interpret the world in terms of one 
ideal, are not peculiar to the mystics. They are creative and 
active in the moral sphere, other creative minds possess in some 
measure a like spirit.
10. Thus the artist is akin to the mystic. The descriptions
of mystical experience in art and in the working of creative in­
spiration are too numerous and well known for quotation.
Emerson in his essay "Inspiration" says, "All the poets have 
signalised their consciousness of rare moments when they were 
superior to themselves, . . • when a light, a freedom,
a power came to them, which lifted them to performances far 
better than they could reach at other times."
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The artlBt receives flashes of insight, instantaneous 
knowledge whose source is in himself, but which he cannot trace. 
Such spontaneous understanding is in him more or less permanent 
and fertile, and so finds expression. For he dwells responsive 
to his intuitions, and gladly suffers their guidance. "For the 
creative imagination the inner world is the regulator; there 
is a preponderance of the inner over the outer." (Ribot, The 
Creative Imagination, p.10.) In this lies the point of the 
comparison of the artist with the mystic.
Like the mystic the artist is governed by one idea which 
controls all other ideas, the realising of beauty in some form. 
Everything in his life tends to be subordinated to this. And 
he shows something of the zealous spirit of the mystic in the 
sincerity and devotion with which he pursues his aim.
All approach th*% state of mystical ecstasy in moments of 
aesthetic contemplation.
An object of art claimed from the change and flow of our 
familiar world presents silent and unchanging some aspect of 
life. It is at omce familiar and yet strange. It gives no 
invitation to activity, the object is real yet ideal, its image 
is without us and within, we are transported for the moment 
into its own static world where movement and discursive thought 
• are irrelevant. There is no end to be attained, our attitude can 
only be one of acquiescence and'repose. So Richard Jeffries 
writes of statuary,"These statues were like myself,full of a
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thought, forever about to burst forth as a bud, yet silent in 
the same attitude.*'
The object of art brings the observer into something of 
its own silence. And since the striving elements are lulled 
within him, he feels more in tune with his experience than at 
any ordinary moment. Distinctions fadç,the thoughts and images 
which arise seem hardly distinguishable from the object, as if 
indeeÜ they were but its echoes.
This effect of union between subject and object is increased 
by the strongly affective character of the experience. The object 
at the outset arouses pleasurable feelings which increase as the 
experience develops, again the suggested images and ideas have 
theiri own affective colouring, feelings and ideas intermingle, 
this blending renders the experience extraordinarily vivid and 
intense.
Bergson puts the matter thus;- 
"The object of art is to put to sleep the active or rather 
resistant powers of our personality, and thus to bring us into a 
state of perfect responsiveness in which we realise the idea 
which is suggested to us and sympathise with the feeling that is 
expressed. In the processes, of art one finds in an attenuated 
refined and somewhat spiritualised form, the processes by which 
one usually obtains the hypnotic state."(Time and Free W i l l , p . )
The interest on the mental side of the experience lies in 
part in the realising of the idea suggested, inpart in the mystery 
of the unity between inner experience and the object which this
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realising brings about. The mystery seems ever about to unfold 
itself, the secret of the beauty of the object and its intimate 
meaning for us are almost clear, we are upon the point of 
understanding once for all not only the expression of the artist's 
thought, but far beyond that the inspiration from which that
I .
expression sprang. Beauty, it need hardly be said, keeps itA 
secret, but this brings no disatisfaction into the aesthetic 
state, for that state is not conscious of a denial, and does not 
work to gain or losjp.
Of all arts it would seem that music gives the deeper and 
more emotional experience. The very strangeness of its language 
is an exciting factor in the feeling and wonder it arouses.
Music sways us so profoundly partly because it has a less 
obviously objective medium of expression than any other art.
Again It is so continuous. We have no time to recover, to turn 
away. Music flows inevitably, without a break, and bears us 
with it. There is no escape, we are swung in an inexorable 
rhythm . And because it has a unique language music is the least 
expressible of arts in any terms but its own, it cannot be 
adequately translated. Mendelssohn says, "Music is more definite 
than speech and to want to explain it by means of words is to 
make the meaning obscure. . . • There are people who
accuse music of being ambiguous, who allege that words are always 
understood: for me it is just the other way; words seem to me 
to be vague, ambiguous, unintelligible if we compare them with
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the true music which fills the soul with a thousand things better 
than words. What the music I like expresses to me seems to me 
too definite rather than too indefinite for anyone to be able to 
match words to it. " (Ribot,The Creative Imagination, p.213.)
This quotation seems to bear witness to the supreme reality 
and satisfaction of the aesthetic experience. The 3x3eas suggested 
have so much meaning, are backed by such emotional stir that they 
may appear more definite than any mental content that can be 
expressed in words. In this case feeling is taken for knowledge.
There are obvious similarities between the state of aesthetic 
contemplation and mystical ecstasy. In the former, however, the 
subject can hardly be uncertain as to the source of his state.
An external object is the starting point of his attitude, and 
its presence keeps him in that attitude, when the objectcfalls 
into the background of his mental content, he emerges from the 
state of contemplation. Because of this controlling, external 
factor he is under no illusion as to the nature of his experience.
The mystic lacking a definite external object has a far more 
moving experience which he interprets as a manifestation of the 
infinite.
Both aesthetic contemplation and ecstasy are examples of 
dissociation of consciousness. In both the active fiat making 
self is quiescent. The mystic recovers unity of consciousness 
and renders it more complete by connecting his ecstatic experience 
with his normal life, he is led to do this through the value he 
attaches to that experience.
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On the other hand for most of us our moments of aesthetic 
appreciation remain detached from the central flow of conscious­
ness. The feeling that moves us then, though often real enough, 
seems to have little bearing on our practical life. This un­
attached and purposeless emotion may, Indeed, act as a disinteg­
rating influence on consciousness. A fact which makes James 
advise us to hasten to perform some kindly act if our sympathies 
have been awakened by any representation of life, lest feeling 
and action become severed, and the power of emotion weakened.
And since the ideas and emotions aroused in the aesthetic state 
are the result of external suggestion, we can understand that 
their effects may be fleeting.
11. The value of responsiveness to suggestion depends of course
to a great extent on the nature of the ideas suggested. And sug­
gestibility in itself seems to indicate either dissociation of 
consciousness or a tendency towards disintegration.
But the power of suggestion or auto-suggestion already 
described in conversion and mystical experience can hardly fail 
to have favourable effects on character. For not only are the con­
trolling ideas in these cases of a nature to aid the development 
of a harmonious moral personality, but suggestion acts as a 
unifying Influence; it brings into touch with the centre of 
consciousness subconscious motives, tendencies and inspirations, 
and so makes unity of desires and active dispositions not only 
possible, but almost necessary.
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"Cur myriad intuitions," says Maeterlinck, who has en­
deavoured to render subconsciousness articulate\\, " are the 
veiled queens who steer our course through life, though we have 
no words in which to speak of them." If subconscious motives 
thus control us, it is obviously desirable that they should 
become conscious, so that tho activities.of consciousness and 
subconsciousness may not be separated, but work together.
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APPENDIX.
And he who beholds all beings in the self, and the self 
in all beings, he never turns away from it. When to a man who 
understands, the self has become all things, what sorrow, what 
trouble can there be to him who once beheld that unity. (Sacrdd 
Books of the East, vol. I, pw 311.)
That (mental condition) . . . .  in which one 
seeing the self by the self, is pleased in the self; in which 
one experiences that infinite happiness which transcends the 
senses, and which can be grasped by the understanding only; 
and adhering to which one never swerves from the truth; ac­
quiring which one thinks no other acquisition higher than it. 
» . . .  Abandoning without exception all desires, 
which are produced from fancies, and restraining the whole 
group of the senses on all sides by the mind only, one should 
by slow steps become quiescent, with a firm resolve coupled 
with courage; and fixing the mind upon the self should think 
of nothing. . . .  . The highest happiness comes
to such a devotee whose mind is fully tranquil, in whom the 
quality of passion has been suppressed, who is free from sin, . 
and who is become (one with) the Brahman. Thus constantly 
devoting his self to abstraction a devotee freed from sin, easily 
obtains the supreme happiness - contact with the Brahman.
(Sacred Books of the East, vol. 8,p. 70.)
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L'ame s'avance ainsi dans son ascension vers Dieu jusqu'à ce qçie, 
s'étant ele'vee au-dessus de tout ce que lui est étranger, elle 
voie seule a seul, dans toute sa simplicité", dans toute sa 
pur et d'y celui dont tout depend, auquel tout aspire, duquel tout 
tient l'existence, la vie, la pensee; car il est le principe de 
l'existence de la vie, de la pensee. Quels transports d'amour 
ne doit pas ressentir celui qui le voit, avec quel ardeur ne i: 
doit il souhaiter s'unir à lui, de quel ravissement ne doit-il 
pas 'etre transporte" ? (Plotinus, En. I, 6.7., translated by 
Douillet.) " .
Puis donc que (dans cette vision de Dieu) il n'y avait pas 
deux chôses, que celui qui voyait était identique à celui qu'il 
voyait, de telle sorte qu'il ne le voyait pas, mais qu'il lui 
était uni, si quelqu'un pouvait conserver le souvenir de ce 
qu'il était quand il se trouvait ainsi absorbe”en Dieu, il aurait 
en lui-meme une image fidèle de Dieu. Alors en effet il était 
lui-m'ê'rae un, il ne renfermait en lui aucune différence, ni par 
rapport a lui-mérae, ni par rapport.aux autres etres. Pendant 
qu'il était ainsi transporté" dans la region céleste, rien 
n'agissait en lui, ni la colère, ni la concupiscence, ni la 
raison, ni m'éme la pensee; bien plus, il n'était plus lui-meme, 
s'il faut le dire, mais, plongé", dans la ravissement, ou l'en­
thousiasme, tranquille et solitaire avec Dieu, il jouissait d'un 
calme imperturbable, renfermé dans sa propre essence, il n'inclinait 
d'aucun cété, il ne se tournait m'eme pas vers lui-nieme, il était 
enfin dans une stabilité parfaite, il était en quelque sorte 
devenu la stabilité même. (En. VI, 9, 11.)
81.
It la clearly necessary for the soul, aiming at its own 
supernatural transformation, to be in darkness and far removed 
from all that relates to its natural condition, the sensual and 
rational parts. The supernatural is that which transcends 
nature, and, therefore, that which is natural remains below.
In as much as this union and transformation are not cognisable 
by any sense or any human power, the soul must be completely 
and voluntarily empty of all that can enter into it, of every 
affection and inclination, so far as it concerns itself. • 
. . . .  On this road, therefore, to abandon one's
own way is to enter on the true way, or, to speak more correctly 
to pass onwards to the goal; and to forsake one's own way is to 
enter on that which has none, namely, God. (St. John of the 
Cross, quoted by Bucks, Cosmic Consciousness, p. 121.)
In so far as this becomes pure contemplation, the soul sees 
clearly that it cannot describe it otherwise than in general 
terms which the abundance of light and happiness forces from 
it. And though at times, when this knowledge is vouchsafed 
to the soul, words are uttered, yet the soul knows full well 
that it has in nowise expressed what it felt, because it is 
conscious that there are no words of adequate signification.
. . . . It is only a soul in union with God that
is capable of this profound loving knowledge, for it is itself 
that union. This knowledge consists in a certain contact of 
the soul with the Divinity, and it is God himself who is then 
felt and tasted. (ibid. p. 124.)
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And even sometimes when I was reading, there came suddenly 
upon me a sense of the presence of God, which did not allow me 
to doubt that he was within me, or that I was entirely engulfed 
in him. • • • •
It (ecstasy) suspends the soul which seems altogether 
beside herself. The will loves, memory seems to be annihilated, 
the understanding ceases to reason, but retains her consciousness, 
she is as if amazed at the grandeur she perceives.
(Life of St. Teresa, translated by D. Lewis, p. 68.)
Whilst the soul is thus seeking God, she feels herself 
faint and die with a most great and sweet delight. Breath fails 
her, all the bodily movements are stilled, she cannot without 
great difficulty move her hands; the eyes close involuntarily, 
and, if they remain open, see nothing; she hears, but without 
understanding what she hears; speech is superfluous for she 
cannot form a word, and, if she could she wants strength to
4
pronounce it; all exterior strength seems gone, and goes to 
swell that of the soul, to help her enjoy her glory more.
(Ibid., pa 139.)
The free inspiration of God is the spring of all our spiritual 
life, thence flows into us knowledge, an inner revelation, which 
preserves our spirits open, and lifting us above all images and 
all disturbance brings us to an inward silence. Here the divine 
inspiration is a secret whispering in the inward ear. God dwells 
in the heart pure and free from evil images. Then first when we 
withdraw into the simplicitas of our heart do we behold the
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immeasurable glory of God, and our intellect is as clear from 
all considerations of distinctions and figurative apprehensions 
as though we had never seen or heard of such things. Then the 
riches of God are open to us. Our spirit becomes desireless as 
though there were nothing on earth or in Heaven of which we
stood in n e e d ................ Lost in the abyss of our
eternal blessedness we perceive no distinction between ourselves 
and God. (Ruysbroek, Vaughan, Hours with the Mystics, p. 254. )
The gate was opened to me that in one quarter of an hour 
I saw and knew more than if I had been many years together at 
a university, at which I exceedingly admired and thereupon 
turned my praise to God for it. For I saw and knew the being 
of all beings, the byes and abyss and the eternal generation 
of the Holy Trinity, the descent and original of the world, 
and of all creatures through the divine wisdom. . . . .  
So that I did not only greatly wonder at it, but did also 
exceedingly rejoice. If you will behold your own self and the 
outer world, and what is taking place therein, you will find 
that you, with regard to your external being are that external 
world. . . « Not I, the I that I am, know these things ;
but God knows them in me. (Jacob Behmen, quoted by Bucke,
Cosmic Consciousness, p. 151.)
When thou standest still from the thinking and willing of 
self, the eternal hearing, seeing and speaking will be revealed 
to thee, and so God heareth and seeth through thee. Thine own 
hearing, willing and seeing hindereth thee, that thou dost not 
see nor hear God. (Ibid., p. 155.)
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All I can say Is that there seems to be a vision possible 
to nan, as from some more universal standpoint free from the 
obscurity and localism which specially connect themselves with 
the passing clouds of desire, fear, and all ordinary thought 
and emotion; in that sense another and separate faculty; and 
a vision always moans a sense df light, so here is a sense of 
inward light. • • . The sense is a sense that one is
those objects, and things, and persons one perceives, (and the 
whole universe) - a sense in which sight and touch and hearing 
aro all fused in identity. • . • • The whole faculty
is deeply and intimately rooted in the ultra moral and emotional 
nature, and beyond the thought region of the brain. (Edward 
Carpenter, quoted by Bucke, Cosmic Consciousness, p. 206.)
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